Video Surveillance In Detention Facilities
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S 517 (1984), examined the applicability of privacy interests of prisoners. The Court concluded that the valid state interests in providing prison security, maintaining prison discipline, and controlling crime outweighed the obviously limited property and privacy interest of an incarcerated or detained individual.
In its analysis the Court stated that for prisoners, society was not prepared to accept any expectation of privacy or use of property as a “reasonable expectation” and therefore worthy of protection by the Fourth Amendment. This was true in Palmer, although the facts were that the jailers intentionally destroyed the prisoner’s property in a random search.
Accordingly, the courts have found that video surveillance of prisoners is warranted and acceptable in most instances, as long as a showing can be made that it was primarily required for security and safety.
In fact, some courts have found that not only are the prisoners' reasonable expectations of privacy reduced, but also the reasonable expectations of privacy of jail employees.
In the California case of Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. County of Sacramento, 51 Cal.App. 4th 1468 (3rd Dist. 1996), the court held that a warrantless silent video surveillance of a county jail's release office, where inmates' property was stored, was held not to violate deputy sheriffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment.
A video camera had been concealed in the office as part of an investigation into thefts of inmates' property was removed after it was discovered by deputies, who filed a civil action against the county and various officials in which it was alleged that the surveillance violated the deputies' statutory and constitutional rights. The court determined that the deputies did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in that setting. The Court noted that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence had long recognized that privacy expectations are diminished in prison or jail settings, primarily due to security concerns.
The court ruled that this applied not only to inmates or visitors, but also to deputy sheriffs who accepted employment in that setting. The court further noted that although one of the plaintiff deputies had worked in the release office one day per week, and believed that he could exclude others, the release office in fact was not exclusively assigned to that deputy, had no lock on the door, and was accessible to any number of people, including other jail employees, outside personnel, and even inmates on cleaning detail. Although there might be parts of the jail in which deputies had a reasonable expectation of privacy against videotaping, such as a bathroom or locker room, the court concluded, that the release office was not such a place.